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013.02.00Abstract Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID) technology is a promising technology. It uses
radio waves to identify objects. Through automatic and real-time data acquisition, this technology
can give a great beneﬁt to various industries by improving the efﬁciency of their operations. How-
ever, this ubiquitous technology has inherited problems in security and privacy, due to the powerful
tracking capability of the tags. This paper proposes a new simple, low cost, and scalable security
scheme relying on one-way hash functions and synchronized secret information. The proposed
scheme provides a two steps mutual authentication between the backend server and the tag which
does not require a secure channel between the tag reader and the backend server to complete the
authentication process. The proposed scheme meets the requirements for tag delegation and secure
tag ownership transfer. The general idea is to change the ID of a tag on every read attempt in a
secure and synchronized manner. This means that attempts like eavesdropping, replay attacks,
tag cloning, tag tracing, denial of service attack, or man-in-the-middle attacks cannot compromise
the scheme. Our analysis results show that the proposed scheme outperforms existing schemes in
terms of security and performance.
 2013 Faculty of Computers and Information, Cairo University.
Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation, abbreviated ‘‘RFID,’’ basi-
cally provides a means to identify objects having RFID tags26 8338.
Faculty of Computers and
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s and Information, Cairo Universi
1attached. Fundamentally, RFID tags provide the same func-
tionality as barcodes but usually have a globally unique
identiﬁer. Using RFID, the identiﬁcation is performed
electromagnetically. Thus, there is, in contrast to barcodes,
no line-of-sight necessary, and the identiﬁcation can also be
performed in contactless way. RFID also has the advantage
that bulk reading is possible and that it is not susceptible
to dust, dirt, or vibration like barcodes. Because of these
characteristics, RFID is envisioned to be a convenient
replacement for optical barcodes in the future. Unfortunately,
RFID also introduces problems respecting data security and
privacy arises. RFID systems have three main components
[1]:ty. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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ﬁcation and communicate with a reader [1]. The reader
passes tag data to the backend server for further process-
ing, including tag identiﬁcation and information retrieval
[2].
 RFID readers: RFID readers send and receive data to and
from tags. RFID readers are the connecting element
between the RFID tags and the backend systems.
 Backend server: Readers are used for querying tags and
reading and writing tag data. All the read data need to
be processed, and the data to be written need to be avail-
able, so that an additional system component is required
to form a complete RFID system which is the backend
server.
RFID tags are classiﬁed into three types: active, semi-
passive, and passive. Active tags contain batteries, so that
they can actively communicate with the reader. Semi-passive
tags also contain batteries, but they wait for the reader’s
query. As for passive tags, the power comes from the reader
[2].
The key challenge in providing security mechanisms to pas-
sive RFID tags is that such tags have extremely weak compu-
tational power because they are designed to be ubiquitous low
cost [3]. This means that heavy duty cryptography is not suit-
able for these types of tags. Our proposed scheme requires
small amount of computation, since it only needs to have a
one-way hash function, which makes the proposed scheme
suitable for these types of tags.
1.1. RFID security problems
The characteristics of RFID systems can cause several threats
which results in serious information leakage. And the adver-
sary can engage in various illegal behaviors by using the ac-
quired information. These threats are addressed in several
studies [4–7] and summarized in [2], [8] and [9]:
 Eavesdropping: As communication between the tag and the
reader is based on radio frequency, anyone can eavesdrop.
 Replay attack: This is an attack in which an adversary
retransmits a message obtained by during the authentica-
tion process.
 Cloning: An adversary can read the tag and then clone the
tag by writing all the obtained data into a blank tag.
 Tag tracing: Attackers can either identify the same tag from
passively logged messages or interact actively with the tag
to understand its location.
 User privacy violation: The adversary can analyze the output
value of a speciﬁc RFID tag and acquire the attached object
information, which can be used to violate the user’s per-
sonal privacy.
 Data forging: Attackers can modify information stored on
tags like prices which causes great loss.
 Denial of Service (DoS) attack: The adversary could block
messages transmitted between a server and a tag. Such an
attack could cause the server and the tag to lose
synchronization.
 Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack: The adversary could
interfere with messages sent between a server and a tag
(e.g., by insertion, modiﬁcation, or deletion).1.2. RFID security requirements
To solve the security problems above, the following security
requirements should be considered. These requirements are
mentioned in [4,7,8,9–11] which are summarized as follows:
 Mutual authentication: The property permits the reader and
the tag in a communication to verify the identity of the
other.
 Conﬁdentiality: An attacker should be able neither to anal-
ogize nor calculate a certain value through all tag messages
transmitted through an insecure channel nor infer a tag’s
own ID.
 Indistinguishability: It is essential that the transmitted tag
information should not be the same as, expectable, or dis-
tinguishable from the transmission information of another
tag.
 Forward security: It is essential that the previously transmit-
ted information cannot be traced using the present trans-
mission tag information.
 Desynchronization resilience. An RFID protocol should be
resilient to attacks that are targeted toward desynchronizing
the tag and the backend server. With the use of shared
secrets and information, it is important that the copies of
any shared secret or information stored at the tag and the
backend server must be consistent.
 Tag delegation: Delegation enables a backend server to del-
egate the right to identify and authenticate a tag to a spec-
iﬁed entity for a limited number of queries.
 Tag ownership transfer: Tag ownership means having
authorization to identity a tag and control all the related
information. Tag ownership transfer implies a shift of such
capabilities to a new owner [12].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 dis-
cusses related works. Section 3 presents the proposed scheme.
Security analysis and performance evaluation are conducted in
Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes the
paper.2. Related work
The authentication protocol proposed in this paper is a hash-
based authentication method. Therefore, the related works
introduced here focus on the hash-based authentication proto-
cols for RFID tags.
The hash-based authentication protocol proposed in [7]
dealt mainly with untraceability as the refreshment of the
shared secret between the tag and the reader or the backend
server; but this suffers severely from adversarial attacks,
including counterfeiting, man-in-the-middle attacks. In other
words, it will most likely fail to carry out mutual authentica-
tion later on account of desynchronization.
Hash-lock protocol [13] used metaID=H(K) to hide the
tag’s real ID, where K is the shared secret between the tag
and the backend server and H is a one-way hash function.
Although this scheme offers certain level of reliability at low
cost, an adversary can easily track the tag via its metaID,
and thus, the transaction secret or privacy would be at risk.
Furthermore, since the key shared between the tag and the
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can easily sniff the channel to spoof the tag later [14]. The pro-
tocol also requires a secure channel between the reader and the
backend server during the authentication process to transfer
the tag ID form the backend server to the reader.
Gervasi [15] proposed a mutual authentication protocol for
RFID tags. The RFID reader and tag will carry out the
authentication based on their synchronized secret information.
The synchronized secret information will be monitored by a
component of the database server. However, the protocol is
subject to denial of service, and tag impersonation attacks as
proved by Piramuthu [16], and backend server takes need work
of O(n) to identify a tag. The protocol also requires a secure
channel between the reader and the backend server to complete
the authentication process.
The following protocol is offered by [17]. This protocol al-
lows for mutual authentication in two message exchanges and
at the same time prevents the tag ID to be compromised during
the authentication process. However, the protocol is not scal-
able; the backend server is not able to handle a large tag pop-
ulation. It is not able to identify multiple tags using the same
radio channel. The server requires an exhaustive search to
identify individual tags. The protocol also requires a secure
channel between the reader and the backend server during
the authentication process to transfer the tag ID between the
backend server and the reader and suffers from desynchroniza-
tion attack.
Shen [18] proposed a novel anonymous RFID authentica-
tion protocol, termed ARAP, which can accomplish the
authentication without disclosing real IDs of the participating
tags, and it offers the anonymity of tags in addition to tag
unlocatability and untrackability. It assumes that each tag
should use and store dynamic pseudonyms IDs. This could
not be applicable to the limited memory RFID tags. The pro-
tocol is also subject to denial of service attack; an attacker can
continuously query the same tag until the tag exhausts all the
pseudonyms. Further, the protocol cannot satisfy the forward
security since knowledge of the stored tag’s pseudonyms can
help to identify tag previous interactions.
Boyeon [19] proposed a protocol for low cost tags using the
hash function, the keyed hash function, the pseudo-random
number generator, and the XOR operator to guarantee the
security and privacy of the RFID system. The protocol is
found to be under an elaborate replay attack which can make
the attacker get authenticated by the tag unlawfully and is also
prone to denial of service attacks [12,14].
Lim et al. proposed a new protocol [4] to solve almost all of
the existing RFID security problems. However, Zhou [14]
showed that information in this protocol can be exposed via
the brute-force attack. It is also found that this protocol is sub-
ject to denial of service attack, since the tag stores the received
random number NR until it received the last message from the
reader to authenticate the backend server. An adversary can
query the tag many times with different random numbers NR
each time. When the tag receives the query with NR from the
adversary, it will store it as a pseudo-random number to
identify the session which consume the tag’s user memory, so
that it can no longer respond to the reader.
Zhou [14] proposed a lightweight anti-desynchronization
privacy preserving RFID authentication protocol. In this pro-
tocol, the backend server keeps the history of the random key
update to prevent the active attackers from desynchronizingthe shared secret between the tag and the backend server.
Although this technique prevents the replay attack, it is found
that there exists a serious problem; an adversary can launch a
denial of service attack. An adversary can query the tag n times
with different random numbers r each time. When the tag re-
ceives the query with r from the adversary, it will calculate and
storeH(Ti ¯ r) as a pseudo-random number to identify the ses-
sion which consume the tag’s user memory, so that it can no
longer respond to the reader.
Finally, Cho [8] proposed a hash-based mutual authentica-
tion protocol as a solution to the privacy and forgery prob-
lems. The protocol is designed to send a random number
generated by a tag to a backend server without disclosure.
However, the backend server takes O(n) to identify a tag. Also,
an adversary can perform a desynchronization attack by inter-
cepting the message in Step 5 [8] and replacing Rt ¯ sj+1 by a
random value v. According to the protocol, the tag will try to
extract sj+1 from v using Rt. In this case, Rt ¯ v „ sj+1, this can
bring system to a mess. Further, the protocol cannot satisfy the
forward security since knowledge of the stored tag’s secret can
help to identify tag previous interactions with complexity
O(248).3. Proposed SRFID scheme
A security scheme to solve the RFID security and privacy issues
is proposed in this section. The scheme provides mutual
authentication and tag ID updating, which can resists most at-
tacks between backend server and tag including tracing, clon-
ing, eavesdropping, and other attacks described in Section
1.1. The proposed scheme also satisﬁes the security require-
ments described in Section 1.2. The proposed scheme is based
on the challenge––response mechanism. The backend server
stores all the relevant information of the tags. The content of
tags is indexed by a unique ID. Therefore, the searching is efﬁ-
cient, and the system is scalable. A tag transmits its current tag
ID to the reader which forwards it to the backend server as in-
dex in the database. In order to cope with the counterfeiting at-
tack issues discussed in Section 1.1, the proposed scheme is
based on the mutual authentication between the tag and the
backend server. The mutual authentication is based on the
sharing of two secret values between the tag and the backend
server.
After a successful mutual authentication, the tag ID is up-
dated by both the tag and the backend server, which provides
the forward security for the system. These secret update mech-
anisms may results in desynchronization attack. To prevent
this attack, the backend server keeps the current records and
the previous records of the update process. While the server
fails to authenticate a tag because of the desynchronization at-
tack, it recovers the old ID from the previous secrete values up-
date record to complete the authentication. A secret update
protocol is also proposed for tag delegation and tag ownership
transfer.3.1. Notation
The following table lists the notations used in the proposed
scheme protocol.
Table 1
Table 1 Notation.
Symbol Meaning
ID The current tag’s ID stored in the server
IDT The current tag’s ID stored in the tag
IDold The previous tag’s ID
IDH The current tag’s hidden ID: Mutually
shared secret between backend server and tag
IDH_old The previous tag’s hidden ID
h() One hash function available to all parties
R Random number generated by the reader
SQN A sequence number: Mutually shared
secret between backend server and tag.
INC() SQN increment function
DEC() SQN decrement function
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In the proposed scheme, the following assumptions are
deﬁned:
1. Tags have limited processing power.
2. Server has signiﬁcantly greater computational ability than a
tag.
3. The channel between the server and the reader is assumed
to be secure if detailed tag information is going to be trans-
ferred from the server to the reader after the authentication
process. Otherwise, the proposed scheme does not require a
secure channel between the server and the tag during the
mutual authentication process.
4. The reader and tags communicate over an insecure channel
5. Tags are passively powered and only need to have a one-
way hash function h(), which makes the proposed proto-
col suitable for low cost RFID-based. Lightweight cryp-
tographic hash functions for implementing RFID
protocols have been recently proposed, for example, Kec-
cak and Quark lightweight hash functions [20,21]. The
RFID tag does not need a pseudo-random number gen-
erator PRNG. This will further reduce the cost of the
RFID tags.
6. The tag and the backend server share two secrete values:
 IDH is a hidden tag identiﬁcation number which is only
known to the tag and the backend server and is updated
each authentication session.
 SQN is a sequence number which is known only to the
tag and the backend server and is updated after each
authentication session. The initial value of SQN is n0.
The sequence number SQN prevents third parties from
using intercepted authentication messages for fake aut-
hentications later on. It also proves to both the server
and the tag that the authentication messages have not
been used before.
These two values are generated by the backend server and
are written in a secure manner into the tag’s user-bank
memory before deployment7. The backend server database stores three more values for
each tag: ID, IDold, and IDH_old, where: ID is the tag’s current ID. Its initial value is
hðIDH jjSQNÞ.
 IDold is the last session tag’s ID.
 IDH_old is the last session tag’s hidden ID.3.3. Authentication process
To carry out the tag identiﬁcation by the authorized devices,
tag, reader, and server conduct the following steps which are
visualized in Fig. 1:
Step 1. A reader transmits a query and a random challenge
number R to the tag.
Step 2. Upon receiving R, the tag computes its current
IDT = h(IDH||SQN) and the messageM1 = h(IDH||R) then
transmits them to the reader which forwards them along
with R to the server. The backend server uses IDT to locate
the tag in the database and uses M1 to authenticate the tag
Step 3. When the backend server receives IDT and M1, it
searches its database for ID to ﬁnd the corresponding tag
record.
Step 4. The backend server computers M 01 ¼ hðIDH jjRÞ and
compares it to the received M1 if they do not match, the
connection is terminated. If, M 01 ¼ M1, the tag is authenti-
cated, Step 5 is performed.
Step 5. The backend server authenticate itself to the tag by:
 Incrementing SQN: SQN= INC(SQN)
 Saving the current value of IDH: IDHold ¼ IDH to prevent
the abnormal operation problem described later.
 Update IDH: IDH = h(SQN||IDH)
 Compute M2 = h(IDH||SQN||R) which is used by the
tag to authenticate the reader and the server.
Step 6. The backend server sends IDT, M2, and R to the
reader which forwards them to the tag.
Step 7. The backend server updates the current tag ID for
the next authentication process by:
 Incrementing SQN one more time: SQN= INC(SQN).
 Saving the current value of IDold: IDold = ID to prevent
the abnormal operation problem described later.
 Computing the next ID of the tag: ID= h(IDH, SQN)
Step 8. When the tag receivesM2 and R, it authenticates the
reader and the backend server as follows:
 Incrementing its SQN: SQN= INC(SQN). This should
match the value of SQN computed by the server in Step
5.
 Computing IDtmp = h(SQN||IDH). This should match
the value of IDH computed by the server in Step 5.
 Computing M 02 ¼ hðIDtmpjjSQN jjRÞ and comparing it to
the received M2:
– If they do not match, the tag restores its last state by
decrementing SQN: SQN= DEC(SQN) and deleting
IDtmp. The connection is then terminated.
– If they match (i.e., the backend server is authenti-
cated), Step 9 is performed.
Step 9. The tag updates SQN: SQN= INC(SQN) and
IDH: IDH = IDtmp to be able to compute
ID= h(IDH||SQN) for the next authentication process.
Figure 1 The proposed SRFID scheme.
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the server in Step 6.3.3.1. Abnormal operation of authentication process
Loss, interception, or blocking of messages exchanged between
the tag and the reader results in abnormal operation of the
proposed scheme. There are three cases:
1. Loss, interception, or blocking of R in Step 1 has no impli-
cations and will not result in any synchronization problem.
The reader will resend R after a predeﬁned time t.
2. Loss, interception, or blocking of ID and M1 in Step 2 has
no implications and will not result in any synchronization
problem; since both IDH and SQN have the same values
in both the tag and the backend server. The reader will
resend R after a predeﬁned time t.
3. Loss, interception, or blocking of R and M2 in Step 5
results in synchronization problem, since the backend ser-
ver’s SQN is greater than the tag’s SQN by two incre-
ments, and both the backend server’s IDH and the tag’s
IDH are different; because the tag’s IDH equal to IDH_old
stored in the server.To solve this problem, the backend server stores IDH_old
which is equal to the tag’s current IDH and stores IDold
which equal to the tag’s current ID. This problem is ﬁxed as
follows:
Step 1. The backend server sends a random number R to
the tag as speciﬁed by Step 1 of the authentication process.
Step 2. When the tag receives R, it computes
IDT = h(IDH||SQN) which is equal to IDold stored in the
server, and computes M1 = h(IDH, R) which is equal to
hðIDHold ;RÞ and sends them to the reader which forwards
them to the backend server.
Step 3. When the backend server receives IDT and M1, it
searches its database for IDT to ﬁnd the corresponding
tag record. In this case, a match is not fond. So, it searches
the database for IDold. If a match is found, the server com-
putes M 01 ¼ hðIDHold jjRÞ and compares it to the received M1
if they do not match, the connection is terminated. If
M 01 ¼ M1, the backend server recomputes M2 which is sent
before in Step 6 of the authentication process:
M2 = h(IDH||DEC(SQN)||R). Note that we used
DEC(SQN) instead of SQN in the calculation of the
message M2 since SQN is incremented in Step 7 of the
94 W.I. Khedrauthentication process after sending M2 in Step 6 of the
authentication process. Also note that using DEC(SQN)
instead of SQN in the calculation of the message M2 does
not implies the changing of SQN value calculated in Step
7 of the authentication process. This step is shown in the
gray area of Fig. 1.
3.4. Tag delegation and ownership transfer
The proposed scheme is scalable. It provides tag delegation
and ownership transfer in an effective way. To prove the sca-
lability of our scheme, we follow the approach and assump-
tions used in [9].
3.4.1. Tag delegation
Tag delegation enables a server to delegate the right to iden-
tify and authenticate a tag to a speciﬁed entity for a given
number of times [9], as described in Section 1.2. Such a pro-
cedure could be used to reduce the computational load on a
server [9].
In the proposed scheme, tag delegation is straightforward.
When a server S wants to delegate tag T to an entity, that is,
allows an entity to query tag m times, it generates the following
values for tag T: IDi; IDiold;M
i
1;M
i
2;R
i, where i= 1, . . ., m.
These values can be easily generated by the server, since the
server does need to interact with the tag or the reader to gen-
erate these values. These values are transferred to the entity via
a secure channel. As a result, the entity can authenticate T a
maximum of m times. However, the entity receiving the delega-
tion right cannot update the tag secrets, as it does not know
IDH or SQN.3.4.2. Tag ownership transfer
In order to achieve ownership transfer of a tag T, S must
transfer the secrets IDH and SQN to the new owner via a se-
cure channel. This transfer should only take place after the
old owner has updated the secrets and identiﬁers for T, in or-
der to protect the privacy of previously conducted transac-
tions against possible tracking by the new owner [9]. The
server of the new owner should also update the tag secrets
after receiving them from the old owner, in order to protect
the privacy of future transactions against possible tracking
by the old owner [9]. This latter update needs to take place
in an environment where there is no possibility of eavesdrop-
ping by the old owner [9]. Once this is complete, only the ser-
ver of the new owner will be able to authenticate T and
update the secrets for T [9]. A protocol to update tag secrets
for secure tag ownership transfer is introduced and visualized
in Fig. 2:
Step 1. The server transmits an update message and a ran-
dom number R through the reader to the tag.
Step 2. Upon receiving R, the tag computes IDT =
h(IDH||SQN) and M1 = h(IDH||R) then transmits them to
the reader which forwards them along with R to the server.
Step 3. When the backend server receives IDT and M1, it
compares them with the stored ID and M1. If they do not
match, the connection is terminated. If they match, the
backend server generates a random number R0 and per-
forms the following computations: M2 = IDH/new ¯ h(R0||IDH), this securely transfer the
new IDH to the tag.
 M3 = SQNnew ¯ h(R0||SQN), this securely transfer the
new SQN to the tag.
 M4 = h(IDH/new||SQNnew||R0)
 IDH = IDH/new, this updates the new owner IDH value.
 SQN= SQNnew, this updates the new owner SQN
value.
Step 4. The backend server sends IDT, R
0, M2, M3, and M4
to the reader which forwards them to the tag.
Step 5. When the tag receives R0, M2, M3, and M4 it per-
forms the following computations:
 IDtmp =M2 ¯ h(R0||IDH)
 SQNtmp =M3 ¯ h(R0||SQN).
 M 04 ¼ hðIDtmpjjSQNtmpjjR0Þ.
Step 6. Compares M 04 to the received M4. If they match, the
tag lets IDH = IDtmp and SQN= SQNtmp. If they do not
match, the connection is terminated.
4. Security analysis
In this section, the security of the proposed scheme with re-
spect to the aforementioned types of attacks, Section 1.1, is
analyzed. Finally, a proof that the proposed protocol satisﬁes
the security requirements presented in Section 1.2 is presented.
4.1. Attack analysis
 Eavesdropping: Throughout the SRFID protocol, the values
the adversary can acquire via eavesdropping are R, ID,M1,
and M2. Also, throughout the tag secret update protocol,
the values the adversary can acquire via eavesdropping
are R0, R, ID, M1, M2, M3, and M4. The adversary tries
to use this information to determine IDH and SQN. As
these values are protected by the hash function and XOR
operation, they cannot be exposed by simple eavesdrop-
ping. Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure against
eavesdropping.
 Replay attack: An adversary cannot reuse messages used
in previous sessions because each response is a crypto-
graphic function of a fresh random number. More specif-
ically, M1, M2, M3, and M4 depend on R. Also, ID
depends on SQN which is shared secrete between the tag
and the backend server and updated each authentication
session.
 Tag cloning: If an adversary wants to clone a genuine tag by
creating a fake tag with the eavesdropping information, he
needs to ﬁrst query the tag and obtains a response which is
ID andM1. Then, the adversary places ID on a counterfeit-
ing tag. The adversary will succeed if the RFID reader
believes that the fake tag is a real one. However, in the pro-
posed scheme, the real tag returns a different hashed value
M1 based on the random number R generated by the
reader. Because the adversary cannot predict the random
number R, the hashed value that the adversary obtains from
the real tag (M1) is not the same as the hashed value that the
reader obtains. Thus, the adversary cannot clone a tag to
fool the reader.
Figure 2 Tag secrets update protocol.
Table 2 Attacks resistance comparison against other schemes.
Attacks Protocol
Shen [18] Boyeon [19] Chen [4] Zhou [14] Cho [8] SRFID
Eavesdropping
p p p p p p
Replay attack
p
-
p p p p
Tag cloning
p p p p p p
Tag tracing -
p
\ \ \ \
Data forging
p p p p p p
DoS attack - - - - -
p
MITM attack
p p p p p p
p
: Resists such an attack.
\: Partially resists such an attack.
–: Does not protect against such an attack.
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tocol, tags responses are random in each session. More spe-
ciﬁcally, ID is a hash of SQN which is secret number and is
updated each authentication session. The identiﬁer ID is
also a hash of IDH which is secret and is updated each
authentication session using SQN. Thus, the adversary does
not know which tag the response belongs to. Therefore, the
location privacy is guaranteed. However, the scheme still
allows a degree of tag tracking, because a tag always replies
with the same hashed ID before the next successful authen-
tication. An authorized reader can query the tag every time
period t to reduce this type of tag tracing attack.
 Data forging: To modify the tag data, an adversary needs
to authenticate himself to the tag. This is not possible,
since the attacker needs to know IDH and SQN toconstruct the message M2 which is not possible. The
attacker who wants to modify IDH and SQN of a valid
tag, using the tag secrets update protocol, needs to know
both the current IDH and SQN. The two secrets are hid-
den by the hash function and the XOR operations. In
addition, the secret information stored on each tag is per-
tinent to itself. Unless the adversary broke the tag via
physical method, he cannot know the secret information
of the tag.
 Denial of Service (DoS) attack: The active attacker can
intercept the ﬁfth message, shown in Fig. 1, from the reader
to the tag. Therefore, the backend server has refreshed the
key, while the tag will not do it. Thus, the shared key
between the backend server and the tag may not be the
same. After a successful DoS attack which is caused by
96 W.I. Khedrdesynchronization attack, the tag can never be legally
authenticated. The desynchronization resistant mechanism
discussed in Section 3.3.1 makes the protocol resistant to
DoS attacks.
 Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack: An adversary cannot
interfere with the exchanged messages by inserting or mod-
ifying messages, because of the use of the random number R
and the secrets IDH and SQN, which are only known to the
backend server and the tag.
A simple comparison of several attacks resistance among
the proposed SRFID protocol and ﬁve of the most recent pro-
tocols [4,8,14,18,19] is shown in Table 2.
4.2. Security requirements analysis
 Mutual authentication: In the proposed scheme, the backend
server can authenticate a tag through a synchronized ID
value, which is updated at every session and created by
the secret values IDH and SQN shared by both the backend
server and the tag. The backend server also authenticates a
tag through a synchronized M1 value in the third message
of Fig. 1, which is created by IDH and a random fresh num-
ber R. Thus, an attacker without knowing IDH and SQN
cannot calculate it. The tag authenticates the backend ser-
ver by computing M 02 ¼ hðIDtmpjjSQN jjRÞ and comparing it
to the received M2 value in the ﬁfth message of Fig. 1 as
described in Step 8 in Section 3.3.
 Conﬁdentiality: The proposed protocol protects the infor-
mation necessary for tag authentication by using the hash
function, and guarantees that only the authenticated object
knowing the tag IDH and SQN pair can verify the informa-
tion. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the proposed pro-
tocol is secure against eavesdropping by an adversary, and
guarantees conﬁdentiality by demanding that the complex-
ity of a brute-force attack is high through the use of hash
functions.
 Indistinguishability: The proposed scheme uses ID to iden-
tify tags. This ID is a hash of SQN which is secret number
and is updated each authentication session. The identiﬁer
ID is also a hash of IDH which is secret and updated each
authentication session using SQN. So, it is impossible to
anticipate the response message of the tag each session
which guarantees indistinguishability.Table 3 Security level comparison against other schemes.
Security requirements Protocol
Shen [18] Boyeon [19]
Mutual authentication
p p
Conﬁdentiality
p p
Indistinguishability
p p
Forward security -
p
Anti-desynchronization
p
-
Tag delegation - -
Tag ownership transfer - -
p
: Satisﬁes the requirement.
-: Does not satisfy the requirement. Forward security: The proposed protocol updates ID and
IDH every session using a one-way hash function. Even
when an attacker has obtained the last IDH and SQN values
of a tag through capturing a tag in a physical way, he can-
not calculate IDH values of previous sessions due to the
one-way property of hash functions (IDH = h(SQN||IDH))
and therefore cannot restore a message of a previous session
(ID and M1) to know or trace a user’s past behaviors. Note
that the tag stores only the last IDH and SQN values.
 Desynchronization resilience. The desynchronization resis-
tant mechanism discussed previously in Section 3.3.1 and
Section 4.1 makes the protocol meet this requirement.
 Tag delegation: The tag delegation mechanism discussed in
Section 3.4.1 makes the protocol meet this requirement.
However, the entity receiving the delegation right cannot
update the tag secrets, as it does not know IDH or SQN.
It also cannot calculate IDH values of previous sessions
due to the one-way property of hash functions.
 Tag ownership transfer: The tag ownership transfer mecha-
nism discussed in Section 3.4.2 makes the protocol meet this
requirement. In order to achieve ownership transfer of a tag
T, server S must transfer the secrets IDH and SQN to the
new owner via a secure channel. Then, the new owner gen-
erates the new values IDH_new and SQNnew and transfers
them to the tag after encrypting them:C
p
p
p
-
-
-
-M2 ¼ IDH new  hðR0jjIDHÞM3 ¼ SQNnew  hðR0jjSQNÞThis transfer needs to take place in an environment where
there is no possibility of eavesdropping by the old owner [9].
The message M4 in Fig. 2 proves to the tag that M2 and M3
are generated by the new owner, since only the tag owner
and the tag can generate h(R0||IDH) and h(R0||SQN).
A comparison of the security level among the proposed
SRFID protocol and ﬁve of the most recent protocols
[4,8,14,18,19] is shown in Table 3.5. Performance evaluation
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed scheme
in terms of computational cost, communication cost, and
storage requirement. First, the computational cost for thehen [4] Zhou [14] Cho [8] SRFID
p p p
p p p
p p p
p
-
p
- -
p
- -
p
- -
p
Table 4 Overhead comparison against other schemes.
Protocol Computation cost Communication Storage
T R S Rﬁ T Tﬁ R T R S
Shen protocol [18] 3H+ RNG RNG O( log m log n) + 3H lR + lH 2lH + lR (m+ 1) lS + lH lR n((m+ 1) lS + lH)
Boyeon protocol [19] 3H+ RNG RNG O(n) + (n+ 1)H lR + lH 2lH lH lR 2n(lS + lH)
Chen protocol [4] 4H RNG O(n) + (n+ 3)H lR + lH/2 5lH/2 3lH lR 3nlH
Zhou protocol [14] 5H RNG O( log n) + 3H+ RNG 2lR + lH/2 5lH/2 lS + 2lH lR n(2lS + 2lH)
Cho protocol [8] 2H+ 2MOD+ RNG RNG O(n) + 2n(H+MOD) 2lR + lH lH + lR lR + 2lS lR 2nlS
SRFID protocol 4H RNG O(1) + 4H 2lR + lH 2lH lS + lH lR n(lS + 3lH)
H: hash operation: RNG: random number generator operation: MOD: modular operation: lH: length of the hash function output: lR: length of
RNG output: lS: length of any stored value.
SRFID: A hash-based security scheme for low cost RFID systems 97proposed scheme is examined. The tag T performs only four
hash operations. These operations are low cost and can be
effectively implemented on low cost RFIDs; lightweight cryp-
tographic hash functions for implementing RFID protocols
have been recently proposed, for example, Keccak and Quark
lightweight hash functions [20,21].The server S requires O(1)
work to identify a tag in addition to four hash operation for
mutual authentication. The reader R performs one random
number generation operation.
Regarding the communication cost, only communication
between the reader and the tag is considered. Table 4 shows
the size of messages exchanged between the tag and the reader,
which in total demands 2lR + 3lH. See Table 4 for the meaning
of lR and lH.
Regarding the storage requirement, each tag stores lS + lH
bits, the backend server stores n(lS + 3lH) bits, where n is the
number of tags and the reader stores lR bits.
To analyze efﬁciency of the proposed scheme, the proposed
scheme is compared with ﬁve of the most recent protocols
[4,8,14,18,19] in Table 4. The comparison shows that the per-
formance of the proposed protocol compares favorably with
existing schemes.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, a hash-based security scheme for low cost RFID
systems (SRFID) is propose. The proposed scheme seeks to
mitigate the performance and security weaknesses of previous
schemes. A security analysis of the proposed schemes is per-
formed by comparing its ability to meet security requirements
against several attacks and ﬁnd that the schemes perform well
against other previously proposed schemes in term of forward
security, desynchronization resilience, secure tag delegation,
and secure tag ownership transfer as shown in Tables 2 and
3. While the added security comes with some costs, it is found
that the costs are reasonable and can be comparable or even
lower than previously proposed schemes. The computation
cost of the proposed scheme outperforms that of other
schemes. A tag T requires only four hash operations. Light-
weight cryptographic hash functions for implementing RFID
protocols have been recently proposed [20,21]. The server S
requires O(1) work to identify a tag in addition to four hash
operation for mutual authentication. The reader R performs
one random number generation operation. The total size of
messages exchanged between the tag and the reader in the pro-
posed scheme (2lR + 3lH) which is the same or less than thoseof the schemes proposed in [4,8,14,18]. However, the total size
of messages of the proposed scheme is less than that of [19]
which is lR + 3lH, that is, the difference is just 32-bits, which
is the size of the random number. The storage cost of the pro-
posed scheme is lS + lH bits for the tag, n(lS + 3lH) bits for the
backend server, and lR bits for the reader. This outperforms
the other schemes except the scheme presented in [19] in which
the tag stores only lS, that is, the difference is just the size of
the digest.
The proposed scheme has two unique features supporting
scalability; a backend server takes only O(1) work for tag iden-
tiﬁcation, and tag delegation and ownership transfer is
straightforward. A protocol to update tag secrets for secure
tag ownership transfer is also introduced.
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